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Summary of Stakeholders' submissions on Israel*

Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

I. Background

1. The present report was prepared pursuant to Human Rights Council resolutions 5/1 and 16/21, taking into consideration the periodicity of the universal periodic review. It is a summary of 31 stakeholders' submissions[1] to the universal periodic review, presented in a summarized manner owing to word-limit constraints.

II. Information provided by stakeholders

A. Scope of international obligations and cooperation with international human rights mechanisms and bodies[2]

2. Alkarama noted that Israel had not ratified the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It had also never accepted the individual complaints procedures under the Optional Protocol of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and article 22 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Israel had not ratified Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute.[3]

3. JS8 stated that Israel should extend a standing invitation to all United Nations Special Procedure mandate holders and prioritise an official visit of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967.[4]

4. JS1 recalled that Israel continued to refuse to recognize the applicability of its international obligations, deriving from treaties that Israel is party to, to the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT).[5] JS5 highlighted that Israel refused cooperation with some human rights bodies.[6] GIC noted that Israel continued to refuse to abide by its international obligations, in particular the Fourth Geneva Convention.[7]

* The present document was not edited before being sent to United Nations translation services.

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II. National human rights framework[1]

5. JS1 indicated that although the recommendation on the establishment of a national human rights institution in accordance with the Paris Principles was common in both cycles of the UPR, Israel did not implement.[2]

III. Implementation of international human rights obligations, taking into account applicable international humanitarian law

A. Cross cutting issues

Equality and non-discrimination[3]

6. EAFORD stated that Israel's Basic Laws still did not explicitly guarantee equality and the prohibition of discrimination.[4] JS1 indicated that in 2016 the Knesset voted against a draft bill that aimed to stipulate the inclusion of an equality clause in Israel's Basic Law.[5] Mecinaj recalled that States recommended that Israel revise its discriminatory laws and enshrine the right to equality for all citizens, but none of the recommendations had been implemented.[6]

7. Adalah noted that while it was a positive step to accept recommendations 136.98, 136.96 and 136.95[7], Israel had enacted more laws that further discriminated against the rights of Palestinian citizens such as, the "Expulsion of Members of Knesset" Law (2016); the Anti-Terror Law (2016); and the "Kaminitz" Law (2017).[8]

8. GBC highlighted that Palestinian citizens of Israel continued to face discrimination in, *inter alia*, access to justice, housing rights, employment, education, health care, and participation in political and public affairs.[9] EAFORD indicated that Ethiopian and Arab Jews inside Israel also experienced institutionalized racism.[10]

9. JS6 stated that LGBTI people in Israel experienced disproportionally high rates of structural, institutional and interpersonal discrimination and violence, and noted that LGBTI-phobia was present in all circles of life, particularly in the public sphere, the education system, the army, and health services.[11]

Development, the environment, and business and human rights[12]

10. EAFORD indicated that contrary to UPR recommendations and UN resolutions reaffirming Palestinian sovereignty over their natural resources, including land, water and energy resources, Israel continued to violate their right to access and freely exploit their natural wealth and resources. Israel obstructed the implementation of reconstruction, development and restricted the maintenance of vital infrastructure, notably by refusing to issue building permits in Area C.[13]

11. EAFORD stated that Israel's depletion and overexploitation of natural resources and the dumping of garbage and untreated water was extremely detrimental to the environment. It noted that the Palestinian economy and Palestinians' socioeconomic rights have sustained tremendous damage due to this.[14]

Human rights and counter-terrorism

12. JS1 noted that the Anti-Terror Law (2016) substantially expanded the scope of the Israeli penal law by incorporating severe provisions of the British Mandatory Defense Emergency Regulations 1945.[15] The law contains broad and vague definitions of 'terrorism' and 'terrorist organizations', which may be exploited by the security services and state authorities, particularly against Palestinians in Israel and/or against political activists.[16]

13. Adalah highlighted that the Anti-Terror Law established new criminal offenses such as public expressions of "support" or "empathy" for terror organizations, and significantly increased the maximum sentences for such offenses. The new law was expected to significantly harm the rights of Palestinians detained, by allowing the use of "secret

evidence".[7] Mezzeh stated that Palestinian citizens were the primary targets of these measures.[8]

2. [illegible]

Right to life, liberty and security of person

14. AI noted that Israeli forces had continued to regularly use reckless and unlawful lethal force against Palestinians, often in the context of Palestinian protests against the Israeli occupation. Between 22 September 2015 and 6 September 2016, AI reported on 20 cases of unlawful killings of Palestinians, including 15 cases in which Palestinians who were not posing an imminent threat to life were deliberately shot dead by Israeli forces.[9] JS7 stated that there had been an increase in extrajudicial killings of Palestinians since 2015 under security protests. Israel then withheld the bodies and only released them to families under certain conditions on their release, including immediate burial.[10]

15. LAWGD noted that Israel continued to violate Palestinians' right to life and security of person, particularly through the use of excessive and often lethal force and the failure to hold perpetrators accountable.[11] HRW stated that in policing situations in the West Bank and Gaza, Israeli security forces repeatedly used excessive force.[12] JS8 noted that on 22 May 2017, protests in the cities of Hebron and Ramallah in the West Bank were violently repressed.[13] JS1 raised the issue of different arbitrary police practices against women protestors.[14]

16. Mezzeh noted that the persistent failure of accountability made possible the continuance of a culture of police violence, where the Israeli Police Investigation Department was thoroughly biased and there was no political pressure to punish Israeli police homicide.[15] Alkarama stated that new regulations passed in 2015 on violent riots allowed opening fire with live ammunitions as an initial option on those throwing stones or firebombs.[16]

17. AI noted that Israel partially accepted recommendations to incorporate the Convention against Torture into domestic law and to prosecute those suspected of committing acts of torture. At the same time, it noted that Israeli forces had continued to torture and ill-treat Palestinian detainees with impunity; and, while a bill criminalizing torture was being drafted by the Ministry of Justice, Israeli law continued to lack the offence of torture based on the definition in Article 1 of CAT.[17]

18. Addameer stated that Palestinian prisoners were often subjected to both psychological and physical torture during interrogation, and described the different forms of torture and ill-treatment employed against Palestinian prisoners.[18] PHR1 received daily complaints from prisoners and detainees held in conditions of solitary confinement.[19] Alkarama noted that confessions, redacted in Hebrew and signed under coercion by Palestinian suspects, were relied upon as the main piece of evidence in Israeli military courts.[20]

19. AI noted that Israel accepted or partially accepted recommendations to minimize its use of administrative detention, however, the authorities continued to use administrative detention. AI stressed that administrative detention orders can be renewed indefinitely and considered that some Palestinians held in administrative detention were prisoners of conscience.[21] Addameer reported that as of May 2017, there were approximately 490 Palestinian administrative detainees held in Israeli prisons, without any charges or any trial procedures. Administrative detention in the OPT was ordered by a military commander and grounded on "security" reasons.[22]

20. ELD noted that in many cases, reasons for the detention were classified and judges refused to reveal the incriminating evidence to the detainees' lawyers.[23] JS3 referred to the discriminatory "Facebook arrests" of Palestinians for alleged incitement to violence or racism in social media.[24] JS8 added that a significant portion of those arrested had been placed under administrative detention.[25]

21. ADF3 reported that the conditions of imprisonment of Palestinians remained abhorrent, marked by the denial of family visits, solitary confinement, overcrowding, poor

hygiene, lack of basic amenities, the denial of access to education, and lack of medical care.[45] Addameer noted that Palestinian prisoners were held across 17 prisons and four interrogation and detention centers inside Israeli territory, and that only one of the prisons was located inside the occupied territory, in contravention of the Fourth Geneva Convention.[46]

22. Addameer reported that since 2013, several Palestinian prisoners and detainees embarked on individual hunger strikes. On 17 April 2017, Palestinian Prisoners' Day, an estimated 1500 Palestinian political prisoners and detainees held in Israeli prisons declared the beginning of an open hunger strike.[47] Adalah noted that they protested against the inhumane conditions of their detention in Israeli prisons.[48] PHRI noted that the Force Feeding law passed in 2015 by the Knesset, authorized a district court to permit the administration of forced medical treatment—including force feeding—to a hunger-striking prisoner.[49]

Administration of justice, including impunity and the rule of law[50]

23. Addameer stated that the right to trial without undue delay for Palestinians in the Israeli military court system was hindered by both legal and practical impediments. The maximum periods of detention for Palestinians detained from initial detention until the conclusion of a trial by military court were significantly longer at each stage of proceedings as compared to those prescribed for the detention of Israelis under the civil court system.[51]

24. HRA-NGO highlighted the serious deterioration in integrity of law and justice agencies as a consequence of the implementation of e-government systems. It affirmed that the validity and integrity of any legal and judicial records of Israel should be deemed dubious at best.[52]

25. AI noted that attacks by settlers against Palestinians had also continued, including harassment, damage to property or physical violence. Notwithstanding a small number of exceptional prosecutions, Israeli investigations into these violations had fallen far short of international standards and in the majority of cases Israeli forces and settlers had not been held accountable despite strong evidence that a crime had taken place.[53]

Fundamental freedoms and the right to participate in public and political life[54]

26. JS5 noted that access to the Al Aqsa Mosque was severely restricted by the ongoing closure of Jerusalem to residents of the West Bank and Gaza and by the regular ban on Palestinian men under the age of 50 from entering the Mosque. Israeli authorities continued to interfere with the internal affairs of Al Aqsa.[55] ODVV noted a policy to turn the mosque into a synagogue.[56]

27. ADF International stated that the Messianic Jewish community reported hostility and discrimination against them in social life, with occasional violence. Arabic-speaking Christians had also accused Israel of discrimination.[57]

28. JS8 stated that Israel continued to restrict freedom of expression, and that the so-called Facebook Bill (Removal of Criminally Offensive Content from the Internet Bill) had passed its first reading in the Knesset.[58]

29. AI noted that while Israel accepted a recommendation to ensure that human rights defenders were able to carry out their legitimate work, the government had increased acts of intimidation and smear campaigns against both Palestinian and Israeli HRDs.[59] JS3 referred to smear campaigns against women human rights defenders in Israel.[60] JS2 raised concerns about other forms of violations against Palestinian women human rights defenders and journalists.[61] 30. FLD reported that HRDs in Palestine were regularly targeted by Israeli forces, in an attempt to deter them from their legitimate work to document Israeli violations.[62] JS8 stated that civil society organisations were subjected to harassment and targeted surveillance.[63]

30. JS3 reported that senior members of the government, including the Prime Minister had launched attacks against NGOs, and also publicly called on European states to stop their funding of the Israeli NGO "Breaking the Silence".[64]

31. JS3 reported on the NGO Foreign Funding Transparency Law (2016) that limited the operation and financing of human rights organizations, requiring NGOs registered in Israel that receive more than 50% of their annual budget from foreign governments to declare their sources of funding in all publications, letters and reports.[65] JS8 added that the law included very high fines.[66] Similar concerns were raised by Alkarama[67], HRW[68] and FLD.[69]

32. JS3 described illegal police practices to suppress protests in Israel, including the refusal of authorization for protests.[70] Adalah referred to the "Expulsion of Members of Knesset" Law (2016), as an attempt to delegitimize the elected representatives of the Palestinian minority.[71]

33. HRW noted that Israeli restrictions on the movement of Palestinians in the West Bank included checkpoints, both within the West Bank and on the Green Line, and the separation barrier slicing through the West Bank, contrary to international humanitarian law.[72] AI noted that these restrictions amounted to collective punishment limiting Palestinians' ability to work and to access healthcare, education and family members.[73]

Right to privacy and family life[74]

34. AccessNow reported that Israeli companies produced surveillance technology that governments around the world deployed to unlawfully interfere with the privacy and freedom of expression of human rights defenders. It noted inadequate oversight of the human rights-infringing activity of Israeli surveillance companies.[75]

35. ADF International indicated that marriage in Israel was conducted on a confessional basis, and must be performed by a registered religious group in order to be valid. it noted that it was not possible to enter into an interfaith or non-religious marriage. In order for interfaith marriages or marriages conducted by a non-religious or an unregistered religious authority to be recognised in Israel, a couple must marry abroad and return to have their marriage inscribed with the civil authorities.[76]

36. JS7 noted that Israel had severely restricted family unification and the registration of children born from a parent holding a West Bank ID and another from occupied East Jerusalem. It noted that the new Israeli law related to health insurance, adopted in 2016 also discriminated against Palestinians living in Jerusalem through family unification in terms of accessibility.[77]

37. JS6 indicated that under Israeli law, the adoption process for a child who is not a biological child of one of the parents was available only to heterosexual couples. JS6 also noted that same-sex male couples interested in giving birth to their own biological child via surrogate motherhood needed a surrogate mother, and the surrogacy law permitted access to surrogacy only to heterosexual married individuals.[78]

38. JS6 indicated that the Israeli regulations on changing the sex designation clause in the public registry ("State IDs") raised procedural obstacles and denied transgender people the right to recognition of their gender identity. Changing the sex designation clause was conditioned on undergoing sex reassignment surgery, but new regulations added another path conditioned on the approval of a Public Committee appointed by the Ministry of Health. JS6 noted with concern some preconditions for the approval.[79]

3. Economic, social and cultural rights

Right to work and to just and favourable conditions of work[80]

39. LAFORD indicated discrimination against Palestinian citizens of Israel in the job market was reflected in income disparity and relegation to low-income and semi-skilled positions.[81]

40. JS1 noted that restrictions on movement, work permits and unequal and discriminatory policies undertaken by the occupying forces in the OPT, hindered the right to work of the Palestinians. Unemployment was rising, standing at 26% in 2015, and informal labor encompassed 59.9% of the total number of workers in the West Bank and the Gaza strip.[82]

Right to social security

41. JS7 stated that Israel had revoked health and social security entitlements as punishment to family members of alleged Palestinians attackers, noting these policies had disastrous consequences on the lives of Palestinians, especially women and children.[97]

Right to an adequate standard of living[98]

42. LAFORD noted that Israel deprived Palestinians of the right to an adequate standard of living and that its actions imperiled livelihoods, heightened poverty and food insecurity, denied Palestinians social services, restricted access to quality medical care and had hurled Gaza into an entrenched humanitarian crisis.[99]

43. Adalah stated that in April 2017, the Knesset enacted an amendment to the Planning and Building Law, known as the "Kaminitz Law", increasing the enforcement and penalization of planning and building offenses, adding this will have a disparate impact on Palestinian citizens after decades of discrimination in land allocation, which had resulted in a severe housing crisis in Arab towns throughout Israel.[100] Meezan stated that this law increased the administrative powers of governmental authorities to implement demolition and eviction orders.[101]

44. JS5 noted that Israel had continued to implement discriminatory urban planning policy in order to change the legal status, the geographic character and the demographic composition of the whole of Jerusalem in favour of the Jewish majority. It added that Israel's policies on Jerusalem promoted a united Jewish capital, implemented through urban planning to quietly deport the Palestinian population out of the city.[102] Al-Haq noted that only 13% of land in East Jerusalem had been zoned for Palestinian construction, while 35% had been confiscated for Israeli settlement use.[103] AI indicated that building permits were very rarely issued to Palestinians in East Jerusalem.[104]

45. JS5 stated that from 2004 to 2016, 685 structures were destroyed in East Jerusalem, displacing 2,513 Palestinians due to lack of permits.[105] Alkarama noted that Palestinians' houses were demolished because they were constructed without the required permits, which are denied in more than 94% of Palestinian applications.[106] JS5 noted that 85,000 Palestinians were at risk of home demolition.[107] HRW noted that Israel had also punitively demolished the homes of families of Palestinians suspected of attacking Israelis.[108]

46. JS2 highlighted that housing demolition and property destruction remained an overshadowing fear for many women living in occupied East Jerusalem.[109]

47. JS7 stated that since October 2015, Israel had gravely escalated the use of collective punishment as a tool of forcible transfer and displacement of Palestinians from occupied East Jerusalem. It added that these punishment policies included house demolitions, residency revocations, closures and other movement restrictions. In January 2017, a bill was reintroduced in the Knesset to grant the Ministry of Interior power to revoke the permanent residency of persons who committed or are suspected of having committed an attack against Israel, as well as their family members.[110]

Right to health[111]

48. PHRI noted that one of the most critical human rights issues facing Palestinians in the OPT was the restrictions placed on freedom of movement and the denial of the right to health. Palestinians cannot transfer to an external medical institution without receiving a medical referral and a financial coverage from the Palestinian Ministry of Health. Palestinian patients then had to receive a timely permit to enter or cross Israel on their way from the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories and Israeli Security Agency, who was authorized to deny the request without giving any explanation to the applicant.[112]

49. MAP stated that the Israeli government did not allow Palestinian patients, even emergency cases or those requiring critical care, to enter East Jerusalem from the West Bank in a Palestinian registered ambulance. They must undergo a procedure known as the 'back-to-back' transfer at a checkpoint, whereby they are moved from a Palestinian

ambulance to an Israeli-registered one, leading to delays and causing medical risk for the patients.[99]

50. JS1 noted that Israel's separation wall and the Gaza blockade prevented Palestinian patients from accessing the six main specialist hospitals for Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza. The crisis in electricity and fuel supply in Gaza had led hospitals to cut most services. Ambulances and health professionals were also affected by access restrictions. The blockade on Gaza resulted in scarcity of essential medicines and equipment.[100]

51. MAP stated that during the 2014 offensive 16 hospitals and 51 primary health clinics were damaged and five clinics and Gaza's only rehabilitation hospital were completely destroyed.[101]

52. JS6 highlighted the situation of Gender Adjustment Treatments, and stated that sometimes the complementary treatments were not accessible to transgender people due to several regulatory failures in this domain.[102]

Right to education[103]

53. SAR noted that Israel established a multi-year, national plan for expanding access to higher education for the Arab, Druze and Circassian populations, addressing high student drop-out rates by providing pre-academic preparatory courses, social support, career transition advice and extension of institutions to outlying areas. SAR stated that minority students and staff remained underrepresented in education and commended the fact that the plan was re-budgeted in the Planning and Budgeting Committee.[104]

54. SAR highlighted that the law denying a Visa and Residency Permit for Advocates of Boycotting Israel, enacted in March 2017 impacted on scholars and students.[105]

55. JS6 noted that the education system in Israel did not include any mandatory educational or informative content regarding LGBTI people.[106]

56. JS5 noted that the educational sector in East Jerusalem was negatively impacted by a shortage of classrooms, a substandard quality of existing facilities and access restrictions for teachers and students. While Palestinian children in East Jerusalem are legally entitled to free public education, approximately 5,300 registered children were not able to enroll in school.[107] JS1 indicated that in comparison to schools residing to West Jerusalem, schools in East Jerusalem were receiving less funding.[108]

57. JS1 noted that the Israeli education system was discriminatory; forcibly integrating their curriculum and culture to the Palestinian official curriculum in East Jerusalem schools, with no respect for the religious and cultural rights of Palestinians.[109] JS5 stated that in 2015 the municipality started imposing Israeli curriculum on schools in East Jerusalem through restriction on funding; in 2016, the Minister of Education decided to "aid the process of Israelization" through extra-funding for schools using Israeli curriculum.[110] Al-Marsad noted that in the Occupied Syrian Golan, a new Israeli curriculum and school system also was imposed.[111]

58. APG23 reported that children from Tuba and Maghayir al-Abeed went to school escorted by an Israeli army patrol, protecting them from threats or attacks of the settlers.[112]

59. JS1 noted that children in the occupied Palestinian territory and particularly in East Jerusalem and Hebron were subject to closure, checkpoints which limit their access to education.[113]. JS1 stated that Israeli forces continued to demolish schools built in Area C.[114]

60. JS1 reported that Israeli forces were preventing the entry of construction materials to Gaza Strip to re-build and re-construct schools damaged during the conflict.[115] SAR stated that travel restrictions had particularly affected academic life in the Gaza Strip.[116] ODVV noted that in the Gaza War, over 200 schools, including three UN schools, were destroyed by Israel attacks. The reconstruction of these schools was hampered by the decade Gaza blockade.[117]

4. Rights of specific persons or groups

Women[118]

61. JS2 reported that in Jerusalem, if a woman is a victim of violence in the household, she will be reluctant to go to the Israeli authorities for fear of being forcibly transferred outside Jerusalem and losing the custody of the children.[119]

62. JS2 indicated that the restrictions in Gaza meant that women had no access to psychological support or safe spaces if they were victims of gender-based violence, and the decline in services was exacerbating the prevalence of gender-based violence, being the largest form of violence in Gaza strip.[120]

Children[121]

63. ECAPT noted that Israel had established a strong set of child-friendly laws and protection mechanisms against sexual exploitation and impressive prevention programmes on sexually transmitted diseases.[122]

64. ECPAT noted that children comprised approximately one third of Israel's total population, and that one group of children most at risk was children without legal status. Other children with vulnerability were children in street situations, children living in institutions, Bedouin, Palestinian and Arab Israeli children.[123]

65. DCIP reported that in 2016, West Bank children suffered the highest losses of the past decade at the hands of Israeli forces and security guards. It indicated that in just the first five months of 2017, nine Palestinian children had been killed by Israeli forces.[124]

66. MCW raised concerns from children detained in the West Bank in 2016, regarding issues such as night arrests, hand ties, blindfolds, physical abuse, strip searches, solitary confinement, and lack of parent accompaniment, access to lawyers, documentation in Hebrew, bail, education in prison, family visits among others.[125]

67. DCIP noted that Israel was the only country that systematically prosecutes between 500 and 700 children each year in military courts, lacking fundamental fair trial rights.[126] DCIP stated that in 2015, Israel renewed the practice of administrative detention of Palestinian children in the West Bank.[127]

68. DCIP stated that around 60 percent of Palestinian children ended up incarcerated in prisons inside Israel, and noted that Israel held increasing numbers of Palestinian children in solitary confinement.[128] Alkarama stated that holding children in detention centers in Israel violates the Fourth Geneva Convention.[129]

69. DCIP noted that children in East Jerusalem were generally subject to the Israeli Youth Law, implemented in a discriminatory manner.[130] DCIP noted that amendments to the Israeli penal code included stricter penalties for throwing a stone. It added that while the 20-year maximum sentencing existed prior to 2015, the word "stone" was added to target Palestinians.[131] GICJ and Alkarama raised similar concerns.[132]

70. DCIP noted that due to 10 years of military Gaza blockade, children continued to slip deeper into poverty, with many still living in protracted displacement.[133]

Persons with disabilities[134]

71. MAP welcomed Israel's ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. It was concerned that, despite Israel accepting recommendation 136.87[135] its occupation of Palestinian territory and its blockade and closure of Gaza continued to obstruct the rights of Palestinians with disabilities. Restrictions on the movement of Palestinians increased the barriers people with disabilities faced when trying to access their local community and the services they need.[136]

72. MAP noted that despite accepting recommendation 136.112[137] in the second UPR cycle, Israel failed to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure during its military offensives on Gaza in 2014, including taking all necessary measures to ensure the protection and safety of persons with disabilities in situations of risk.[138]

Minorities and indigenous peoples[139]

73. JS4 stated that the new "Plan for Economic and Social Development among the Bedouin Community in the Negev 2017-2021" approved in February 2017, allocated large budgets to strengthen economic and social services among the Bedouin community, in the fields of education, employment, infrastructure, and strengthening Bedouin local councils. It observed that while this plan had some positive elements, it deliberately disregarded the 35 unrecognized Bedouin village and will only be implemented in the seven government-planned towns and the 11 recognized villages. According to JS4, it aimed at relocating citizens from unrecognized villages into government-planned towns and recognized villages.[140]

74. Adalah noted that the Memorandum of Law on the Regulation of Bedouin Settlement in the Negev, referred to as "Prawer II" continued to be dispossess and forcibly displace Bedouin citizens from the unrecognized villages.[141] Meezaan added that it denied Bedouin land claims, sought to concentrate the Bedouin in urban centers, and was expected to displace and relocate up to 70,000 Bedouin residents.[142]

75. JS4 noted that in most of the unrecognized villages there were no schools or health clinics. These villages lacked infrastructure, including electricity, running water, paved roads and sewage disposal systems.[143]

76. JS4 noted that regarding recommendation 136.84[144], no significant change was made in infant mortality gaps between Bedouin and Jewish residents of the Negev-Naqab.[145]

77. JS4 indicated that recommendation 136.100[146] was not met over the past five years, as by and large, the State of Israel had been mainly acting towards ending Bedouin possession over land in the Negev.[147] JS4 stated that Israel should recognize Bedouin land ownership rights instead of gradually dismissing all Bedouin land claims.[148]

78. JS4 noted that the house demolition policy, widely employed by the State against its Bedouin citizens, did not meet recommendation 136.98[149].[150] Meezaan stated that annual house demolitions in the Bedouin localities had increased, recently reaching an average of about 1,000 annual demolitions.[151]

79. Regarding recommendations 136.96 and 136.99[152], JS4 noted the ongoing inequality in planning in the Negev-Naqab, where126 settlements were established for the Jewish community, and only 18 were recognized Bedouin settlements.[153] Adalah indicated that Israel sought to use Bedouins' former lands to establish new Jewish communities, man-made forests, and other state infrastructures.[154]

Migrants, refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced persons[155]

80. AI noted that asylum-seekers in Israel continued to be denied access to a fair and prompt refugee status determination process. It mentioned that the Knesset had passed the fourth version of an amendment to the Prevention of Infiltration Law, allowing the authorities to detain asylum-seekers for up to one year without charge. AI also observed that the authorities continued to press thousands of Sudanese and Eritrean asylum-seekers to leave Israel "voluntarily".[156]

5. Specific regions or territories[157]

81. HRW noted that Israel continued to systematically expand its settlements in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and to transfer Israeli citizens into the settlements in violation of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. By 2017, Israel had established 237 settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, housing approximately 580,000 settlers.[158] JS1 noted that Israel applied Israeli civil law to settlers, affording them legal protections and rights that were not extended to Palestinians living in the same territory subjected to Israeli military law.[159]

82. Badil reported on what it referred to as Israel's colonization of the OPT could be identified, such as demographic manipulation; de facto and de jure annexation; and domination over Palestinians through an illegally imposed discriminatory legal system.[160]

83. JS2 stated that Israel passed a law in the Knesset that retroactively legalizes settlement construction on privately owned Palestinian land, as well as legalizing settlement outposts, creating an obstacle to reaching a durable solution to the conflict.[161]

84. Alkarama noted the construction of new Israeli settlements in the OPT, despite the United Nations Security Council Resolution of 23 December 2016 demanding that Israel immediately and completely cease all settlement activities.[162] GICJ noted that in January 2017 alone, Israel approved the construction of 2,500 housing units in the occupied West Bank.[163] APG23 cited the plan to build 600 new houses in East Jerusalem.[164]

85. AI noted that in July 2014 Israel launched a 50-day military offensive in the Gaza Strip (*Operation Protective Edge*) that killed over 1,500 civilians, including 539 children, wounded thousands of civilians, and caused massive civilian displacement and destruction. Three years later, the Israeli authorities had indicted only three soldiers for looting and obstructing an investigation.[165]

86. Al-Haq noted that the 10th year of Israel's closure of the Gaza Strip had created a man-made humanitarian crisis, where 80 percent of Gazans were dependent on humanitarian aid.[166] Badil stated that Palestinians were denied access to natural resources such as natural gas, fishing waters and agricultural lands as well as living under an ongoing electricity crisis.[167]

87. HRW stated the Israeli navy, which patrols Gaza's Mediterranean coast, limited Palestinian fishing to a zone south of the Israel-Gaza border and north of the Egyptian border, up to six nautical miles (recently extended on a temporary basis to nine) west of the Gaza coast.[168]

88. Al-Marsad noted that there were at least 23,000 Israeli settlers in the Occupied Syrian Golan, living in 34 illegal settlements. The remaining native Syrian population of 25,000 lived in five villages located in the far north of the Occupied Syrian Golan. It added that the Israeli government approved plans for the construction of 1600 new settlement units in the Israeli settlement of Katzrin. It noted that discriminatory land and housing policies had meant that the remaining Syrian villages in the Occupied Syrian Golan were severely overcrowded.[169]

89. Al-Marsad noted that the majority of the native Syrian population continued to reject Israeli citizenship.[170]

Notes

[1] The stakeholders listed below have contributed information for this summary; the full texts of all original submissions are available at: www.ohchr.org. (One asterisk denotes a national human rights institution with "A" status)

Civil society

Individual submissions:

AccessNow	AccessNow (United States of America);
Adalah	Adalah- The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel (Israel);
Addamer	Addamer-Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association (Israel);
ADF International	ADF International (Switzerland);
AI	Amnesty International (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland);
Al-Haq	Al-Haq- Law in the Service of Man (Ramallah, Palestine);
Alkarama	Alkarama Foundation (Switzerland);
Al-Marsad	Al-Marsad- Arab Human Rights Centre in the Golan Heights (Occupied Syrian Golan);
APG23	Association "Comunita Papa Giovanni XXIII" (Italy);
Badil	Badil Resource Center for Palestinian Residency & Refugee Rights (Palestine);
DCIP	Defense for Children International-Palestine (Palestine/Israel);
EAFORD	International Organization for the Elimination of All Forms of

	Racial Discrimination (Switzerland);
ECPAT	ECPAT International (Thailand);
FLD	Front Line Defenders (Ireland);
GICJ	Geneva International Centre for Justice (Switzerland);
HRA-NGO	Human Rights Alert NGO (Israel);
HRW	Human Rights Watch (Switzerland);
MAP	Medical Aid for Palestians (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland);
MCW	Military Court Watch (Ramallah, Palestine);
Meezaan	Meezaan Center for Human Rights Nazareth (Israel);
ODVV	Organization for Defending Victims of Violence (Iran);
PHRI	Physicians for Human Rights-Israel (Israel);
SAR	Scholars at Risk Network (United States of America).
Joint submissions	
JS1	**Joint submission 1 submitted by**: Al Marsad-Social, Economic Policies Monitor (Lebanon);
JS2	**Joint submission 2 submitted by**: Women's Center for Legal Aid and Counselling (WCLAC), Community Action Center (CAC) - Al-Quds University, and The Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms (MADA), with the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) (Switzerland);
JS3	**Joint submission 3 submitted by**: Human Rights Defenders Fund; Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel; Al Tufula Pedagogical & Multipurpose Women's Center; Coalition of Women for Peace; The Association Women Against Violence (Israel);
JS4	**Joint submission 4 submitted by**: Negev Coexistence Forum for Civil Equality; Regional Council for the Unrecognized Villages; Alhuquq Center; Sidreh - Lakiya Negev Weaving (Israel);
JS5	**Joint submission 5 submitted by**: Coalition of 17 organisations Adalah Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association Al-Haq Arab Thought Forum Arab Studies Society, Maps and GIS Department Defence for Children International – Palestine Section Early Childhood Resource Center General Federation of Workers Trade Unions of Palestine Jerusalem Society for Welfare and Development Jerusalem Legal Aid and Human Rights Center Jerusalem Center for Democracy and Human Rights Land Research Center The Grassroots Palestinian Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign The Jerusalem Arab Chamber of Commerce and Industry The Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy, MIFTAH The Palestinian Counselling Center The Society of Saint Yves The Palestinian Union of Social Workers Union of Health Work Committees Vocational Training Center Welfare Association Women's Center for Legal Aid and Counselling Women's Studies Center Yabous Cultural Center (Jerusalem Palestine);
JS6	**Joint submission 6 submitted by**: 'Hoshen' – Education and Change; 'Ha-Aguda' – the National Association of LGBT in Israel; 'Havruta' – Religious Gays; 'Ma'avarim' – Israeli Transgender Community; 'Tehila' – Support for Parents and Families of LGTB; the LGBT House in Be'er Sheva and The Association of Israeli Gay Fathers (Israel);
JS7	**Joint submission 7 submitted by**: Community Action Center (Al-Quds University); Al-Haq; Society of St. Yves - Catholic Center for Human Rights (St. Yves); the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies CIHRS (Jerusalem Palestine);
JS8	**Joint submission 8 submitted by**: CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation; Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations Network; Arab NGO Network for Development

(South Africa).

[2] The following abbreviations are used in UPR documents:

ICERD	International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination;
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;
OP-ICESCR	Optional Protocol to ICESCR;
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
ICCPR-OP 1	Optional Protocol to ICCPR;
ICCPR-OP 2	Second Optional Protocol to ICCPR, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty;
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women;
OP-CEDAW	Optional Protocol to CEDAW;
CAT	Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;
OP-CAT	Optional Protocol to CAT;
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child;
OP-CRC-AC	Optional Protocol to CRC on the involvement of children in armed conflict;
OP-CRC-SC	Optional Protocol to CRC on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography;
OP-CRC-IC	Optional Protocol to CRC on a communications procedure;
ICRMW	International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families;
CRPD	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities;
OP-CRPD	Optional Protocol to CRPD;
ICPPED	International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.

[3] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/25/15, paras 136.1-136.12, 136.14-136.16, 136.29-136.46, 136.50-136.52, 136.160, 136.188, 136.195-136.199, 136.201, 136.236-136.237.

[4] Alkarama, p.3.

[5] JS8, p.15. See also JS5, p.11; JS1, p.2.

[6] JS1, p.1.

[7] JS5, p.11. See also CIGC, p.1.

[8] GIGC, p.1. See also JS5, p.11; AI, p.5.

[9] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/25/15, paras.136.13; 136.25-136.26; 136.28; 136.47-136.49; 136.78; 136.108; 136.111; 136.135; 136.152-136.154; 136.157-136.158; 136.161; 136.163-136.164; 136.166-136.188; 136.170-136.175; 136.177; 136.179-136.180; 136.182-136.187; 136.189-136.193; 136.200; 138.202-136.204; 136.206-136.207; 136.218-136.219; 136.221-136.225; 137.5-137.7.

[10] JS1, p.2.

[11] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.17-136.18; 136.20-136.21; 136.27; 136.53-136.55; 136.57-136.59; 136.61-136.63; 136.107; 136.110; 136.146; 136.203; 137.2.

[12] EAFORD, p.1.

[13] JS1, p.2.

[14] Meezaan, p.1. See also Adalah, p.2-3.

[15] A/HRC/25/15 recommendations 136.58 (Canada); 136.90 (Cyprus) and 136.95 (Norway).

[16] Adalah, p.2-3.

[17] GICG, p.2.

[18] EAFORD, p.6.

[19] JS6, p.14.

[20] For relevant recommendation see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.234.

[21] EAFORD, p.3-4.

[22] EAFORD, p.4.

[23] JS3, pp.2-3. See also Adalah, p.3; Meezaan, p.6.

[24] JS3, p.2-3. See also AI, p.8; Meezaan, p.7.

[25] Adalah, p.3.

[26] Meezaan, p.6.

[27] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.22, 136.113, 136.115-136.125, 136.129-136.133.

[28] AI, p.6-7. See also Badil, p.6; EAFORD, p.2.

[29] JS7, p.6. See also GICJ, p3.
[30] EAFORD, p.2.
[31] HRW, p. 1-2.
[32] JS8, p. 10-11. See also JS2, p. 4.
[33] JS3, p. 5.
[34] Meezaan, p. 4.
[35] Alkarama, p. 3. See also JS2, p. 3, PHRI, p. 4-5.
[36] AI, p. 2-3.
[37] Addameer, p. 3-4. See also Adalah, p. 6, GICJ, p. 4.
[38] PHRI, p. 4. See also ODVV, p.3, Alkarama, p. 5-6.
[39] Alkarama, p. 5-6.
[40] AI, p. 2. See also Alkarama, p. 6-7. GICJ, p.4, Adalah, p. 5, JS8, p. 5-6.
[41] Addameer, (p. 2) See also HRW, p. 5-6, GICJ, p. 4.
[42] FLD, p. 3.
[43] JS3, p. 5.
[44] JS8, p. 9.
[45] GICJ, p. 4. See also Adalah, p. 5.
[46] Addameer, p.1.
[47] Addameer, p4.
[48] Adalah, p. 5. See also PHRI, p. 6-7, JS8, p. 10-11, Alkarama, p. 5-6.
[49] PHRI, p. 6-7. See also Addamer, p. 4, ODVV, p. 3.
[50] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.65-136.66, 136.208-136.210.
[51] Addameer, p. 2.
[52] HRA-NGO, p. 2-9.
[53] AI, p. 1. See also. HRW, p. 1.
[54] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.67-136.77; 136.79-136.80; 136.109; 136.142-136.144; 136.148-136.151; 136.162; 136.169; 136.211-136.217; 136.176; 136.178; 136.181; 137.1; 137.3.
[55] JS5, p. 7-8. See also EAFORD, p. 5.
[56] ODVV, p. 5.
[57] ADF International, p. 1-2.
[58] JS8, p. 7.
[59] AI, p. 3-4. See also JS8, p. 4; FLD, p. 4; GICJ, p. 3-4; ODVV, p. 5.
[60] JS3, p. 6.
[61] JS2, p. 8. See also GICJ, p. 3-4.
[62] FLD, p. 3. See also GICJ, p. 3-4; ODVV, p. 5.
[63] JS8, p. 4. See also FLD, p. 4.
[64] JS3, p.7-8.
[65] JS3, p. 3.
[66] JS8, p. 4.
[67] Alkarama, p. 8.
[68] HRW, p. 2.
[69] FLD, p. 1.
[70] JS3, p.5. See also EAFORD, p.5.
[71] Adalah, p. 2.
[72] HRW, p. 4-5. See also JS5, p. 8-9; JS2, p. 4; AI, p. 4.
[73] AI, p. 4.
[74] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.23-136.24; 136.56.
[75] AccessNow, p. 1-3.
[76] ADF International, p. 3.
[77] JS7, p. 4-5. See also EAFORD, p. 6; JS2, p. 7.
[78] JS6, p. 11-12.
[79] JS6, p. 4-7.
[80] For relevant recommendation see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.82.
[81] EAFORD, p. 5.
[82] JS1, p. 4-5.
[83] JS7, p. 6.
[84] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/25/15, paras 136.145; 136.165; 136.226-136.229; 136.235.
[85] EAFORD, p. 5. See also ODVV, p. 2.
[86] Adalah, p. 3.
[87] Meezaan, p. 1.
[88] JS5, p. 1-2. See also JS5, p. 5; 8-9; JS7, p. 2; Al-Haq, p. 4; EAFORD, p. 5.

[97] Al-Haq, p. 2. See also JS7, p. 2; JS2, p. 3.
[98] AI, p. 7. See also HRW (p. 3-4).
[99] JS, p. 5.
[100] Alkarama, p. 5.
[101] JS5, p. 6. See also Al-Haq (p 3); AI, p. 7.
[102] HRW, p. 3-4. See also GIC, p. 2.
[103] JS2, p. 3.
[104] JS7, p. 6. See also JS5, p. 4.
[105] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.83-136.84.
[106] PHRI, p. 1.
[107] MAP, p.2.
[108] JS1, p. 6. See also ODVV, p. 2; PHRI, p. 2.
[109] MAP, p. 3.
[110] JS6, p.8-11.
[111] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.85-136.86.
[112] SAR, p. 3.
[113] SAR, p. 4.
[114] JS6, p. 15.
[115] JS5, p. 2-3.
[116] JS1, p. 7.
[117] JS1, p. 7.
[118] JS5, p. 2-3.
[119] Al-Marsad, p. 4.
[120] APG23, p. 4.
[121] JS1, p. 7. See also SAR, p. 5.
[122] JS1, p. 7. See also EAFORD, p. 5.
[123] JS1, p. 7.
[124] SAR, p. 5.
[125] ODVV, p. 5.
[126] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.19; 136.60; 136.64; 136.81.
[127] JS2, p. 7.
[128] *JS2, p. 4.*
[129] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.112; 136.114; 136.126-136.128; 134.134; 136.136-136.141; 136.159; 136.194; 137.4.
[130] ECPAT, p. 3-4.
[131] ECPAT, p. 2.
[132] DCIP, p. 1-4.
[133] MCV, p. 2-5. See also HRW, p. 6; Alkarama, p. 7-8.
[134] DCIP, p. 2.
[135] DCIP, p. 3. See also, HRW, p. 6.
[136] DCPI, p. 2-3. See also MCW, p. 1.
[137] Alkarama, p. 7-8. See also CIGC, p. 4.
[138] DCIP, p. 4.
[139] DCIP, p. 5. See also HRW, p. 6; Alkarama, p. 7-8.
[140] GIC, p. 4; Alkarama, p. 3.
[141] DCIP, p. 1.
[142] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.87-136.89.
[143] A/HRC/25/15 recommendation 136.87 (Canada).
[144] MAP, p. 4-5.
[145] A/HRC/25/15 recommendation 136.112 (Norway).
[146] MAP, p. 5.
[147] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.90-136.103.
[148] JS4, p. 5-6. See also Mezzaan, p. 2; Adalah, p. 4-5; AI, p. 7; EAFORD, p. 4; ODVV, p. 2.
[149] Adalah, p. 4-5.
[150] Mezzaan, p. 3.
[151] JS4, p. 3-4.
[152] A/HRC/25/15 recommendation 136.84 (Belgium).
[153] JS4, p. 12.
[154] A/HRC/25/15 recommendation 136.103 (Belgium).
[155] JS4, p. 6.
[156] JS4, p. 6-7.
[157] A/HRC/25/15 recommendation 136.98 (Australia).

[1] JS4, p 8.
[2] Mezvrano, p. 2. See also Al-Haq, p 3; HRW, p. 4.
[3] A/HRC/29/19 recommendation(s) 136.96 (France); 136.99 (Czech Republic).
[4] JS4, p. 10-11.
[5] Adalah, p. 4-5.
[6] For relevant recommendation(s) see A/HRC/29/19, paras. 136.104-136.106, 136.147, 136.155-136.156, 136.231-136.233.
[7] Al, p. 7.
[8] For relevant recommendation(s) see A/HRC/29/19, paras 136.107-136.108, 136.151-136.154 136.164-136.168-136.170, 136.173-136.174, 136.176-136.178, 136.180, 136.187, 136.203, 136.214-136.217, 136.230, 137.9, 137.7.
[9] HRW, p. 1. See also GI-ER 1, p. 1; Addameer, p. 1.
[10] JS5, p. 1. See also JS7, p. 2; Badil, p. 2; MIFW, p. 5; JS2, p. 9.
[11] Badil, p. 1-6.
[12] JS2, p. 6. See also HRW, p. 3; GIEVV, p. 4; ITJ, p. 2.
[13] Shezawiya, p. 5.
[14] GI-3, p. 7.
[15] AI9-23, p. 2.
[16] Al, p. 6. See also Badil, p. 3; Al-Haq, p. 5; Shezawiya p. 4; Shezawiya, p. 4; HRW, p. 1; GIEVV, p. 3; GIEVV, p. 1.
[17] Al-Haq, p. 5. See also GI-ER 1, p. 1.
[18] Badil, p. 1. See also GI-3, p. 1; ILO 0003, p. 2-4.
[19] HRW, p. 4.
[20] Al-Marsad, p. 1-2.
[21] Al-Marsad, p. 4.